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1 Arguments and contentions
Consistent with most handbooks on informal logic, arguments may be de-
fined as series of at least two statements, where exactly one of them (the
conclusion) is allegedly justified by the others (the premises). The truth or
acceptability of the premises and their logical connection with the conclusion
determine whether its conclusion is true or acceptable. For example:
Argument 1 (Simpsons). (1) All Simpsons are yellow. (2) Lisa Simpson is
a Simpson. (3) Thus, Lisa Simpson is yellow.
This definition is problematic for at least two reasons.
First, the concept of argument refers more to a chain of reasoning than
to series of logically connected sentences. In fact, the word argument comes
from the Latin verb arguo, arguer, argui, argutus, which means to put in clear
light, which comes from ἀργός, the Greek adjective for bright. In some way, an
argument is something that makes clear enough why its conclusion is true or
is to be believed, and not just a series that happens to justify its conclusions
for reasons that are not fully stated. In this way, a valid argument would be
more like a rigorous proof, as in the latter we do find each step justified.
I will not deal with this first objection because, although important, it
will not affect my treatment, which will consist of examples whose validity
or non-validity will be sufficiently manifest (like in our argument 1). Hence,
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in this paper I will not require that each step of an argument has a proof-like
justification.
The second objection is the motive of this paper, and it deals with how
we normally differentiate an argument from series of statements in general.
The way this happens is the Simpsons arguments is through the conclusion
marker ‘thus,’ which turns the otherwise unconnected series ‘1.1, 1.2, 1.3’ into
an argument with ‘1.3’ as a conclusion. A conclusion marker is a word or
expression that indicates—in the relevant contexts—that the sentence that
follows is the conclusion of an argument [see 5, ch. 3]. Other conclusion
markers are ‘hence,’ ‘therefore,’ and ‘ergo.’1 This implies, though, that the
following series should also be considered an argument:
Contention 2 (Cookies). (1) I like cookies. (2) Therefore, Ana is French.
That this fits the definition of an argument is seldom deemed as a flaw in the
definition of what an argument is. After all, the premises are so manifestly
irrelevant for the conclusion that it can be immediately dismissed.
However, I do not see how can anyone rationally allege that 2.1 justifies
its conclusion. Nothing in the premise affects the plausibility of the conclu-
sion, which is why I do not think this particular contention should qualify
as a proper argument. That the conclusion of a series of statements be pre-
ceded by a (formal or informal) conclusion marker is, in my consideration,
far from being a sufficient condition for that series to be called an argument.
Instead, I will call a contention to any series where exactly one of them (the
conclusion) is preceded by a conclusion marker, and try to clarify the special
characteristics of arguments. Arguments are, of course, also contentions, but
of a very special kind: they satisfy some conditions that make their premises
relevant for their conclusion, even when the argument is not valid.
2 Validity
When we asses the quality of an argument, we are normally concerned about
two things. First, whether its premises are true and, second, whether the
conclusion follows from the premises. When an argument fulfils the later
condition we say that it is a valid one, and when it also fulfils the former,
we say that it is a sound one. The Simpsons argument is valid, as it has the
1In other contexts, we can indirectly indicate the conclusion by signalling the premises
through ‘reason markers,’ which indicate that the following sentence(s) are the premises
of an argument: these are words like ‘because,’ ‘since,’ and ‘for.’ So our argument could
also be stated as: ‘Lisa Simpson is yellow because all Simpsons are yellow and she is a
Simpson.’ For simplicity’s sake, though, I will only work with conclusion markers.
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structure of a well-known syllogism, but whether it is sound depends on how
we interpret the predicate Simpsons: if Simpsons denotes the set comprising
the Simpson family, then 1.1 is true and our argument is sound, but if it
denotes the set of all characters of that show, premise 1.1 can no longer be
true since Apu Nahasapeemapetilon is not yellow.
This is not the place for explaining in detail what makes a contention
or an argument valid or not. However, it is very common to differentiate
between deductive and inductive standards of validity. An deductively valid
argument is one whose conclusion cannot possibly be false if its premises are
true. This is obviously the case for argument 1.
An inductively valid argument, instead, is an argument whose premises
support the conclusion with a sufficiently high probability. This probabilistic
support is to be understood informally or pre-theoretically throughout this
paper, although the theoretical sense of mathematical probability is a special
case of this informal sense. Hence, under some conditions, the following is a
classical example of an inductively valid argument.
Argument 3. (1) The swan s1 is white. (2) The swan s2 is white. ... (n) The
swan sn is white. (n
′) Therefore, all swans are white.
Note that deductive validity is just a special case of inductive validity. Af-
ter all, a deductively valid argument supports its conclusion with absolute
probability, which definitely is a sufficiently high probability.
A very important notion related to deductive validity is that of logical
entailment. Where σ1, ..., σn  φ states that the series σ1, ..., σn logically
entails φ, I define (logical) entailment as follows:
Definition 4 (Entailment). σ1, ..., σn  φ iff φ is true if all σ1, ..., σn are true.
It is very tempting to state that a deductively valid argument is just one
whose conclusion is entailed by its premises. However, to do so would be
problematic as it would make deductively valid any argument with a logi-
cally absurd premise (assuming ex falso quodlibet) or with a logically true
conclusion regardless of what they say. This would make valid any argu-
ment of the form ‘φ1, ..., φn, thus, it is possible that ψ’, unless ψ is a logical
absurdity.
This clearly disregards what I deem as Hamblin’s most important cri-
terium for identifying good arguments:
The conclusion must be such that, in the absence of the argument,
it would be less accepted than in its presence. [2, p. 245]
3
This criterium accounts, in my consideration, for the very extended demand
that the premises of a good arguments be relevant for its conclusion. A
probabilistic rephrasing of Hamblin’s criterium would be:
The conclusion must be such that, in the absence of the argument,
it would be less probable than in its presence.
This leads to the following redefinition of deductive validity,
where σ1, ..., σn : . φ stands for a contention (or an argument) from the series
of premises σ1, ..., σn to the conclusion φ, P(φ), for the probability of φ, and
P(φ | σ1, ..., σn), the for conditional probability of φ given all of σ1, ..., σn:
Definition 5 (Deductive validity). A contentions p1, ..., pn : . q is deduc-
tively valid iff (1) p1, ..., pn  q, (2) P(q) < P(q | p1, ..., pn), and (3) the
set {p1, ..., pn} is not trivial (it does not entail every statement).
The third condition avoids that an argument be valid just because, by
the principle ex falso quodlibet, it logically follows from its (logically) false
premises. This would be most undesirable as the premises would not be very
relevant for our belief in the conclusion. Furthermore, it is difficult to see how
a necessarily unsound argument ever should be deemed as a valid one. On
the other hand, note that 5.2 prevents that there be a valid argument whose
conclusion is a logical truth. If this was the case, it would be impossible
for the conditional probability of q on any set of premises whatsoever to
be greater than its probability tout court, as it would already equal the
maximum probability.
Now, not only can definition 5 be generalised for inductive validity but,
in doing so, we will also discover some of the logical ground of inductive
validity. Where τ is our inductive threshold, i.e. the smallest probability
value sufficiently high for accepting a proposition, inductive validity can be
defined as follows.
Definition 6 (Inductive validity). A contention p1, ..., pn : . q is inductively
valid iff (1) p1, ..., pn  P(q) ≥ τ, (2) P(q) < P(q | p1, ..., pn), and (3) the
set {p1, ..., pn} is not trivial.
This definition suggests that inductive validity works because any inductively
valid argument can be easily transformed into a deductively valid one [cf. 1,
ch. II], as the following deductivisation of argument 3 shows:
Argument 7. (1) The swan s1 is white. (2) The swan s2 is white. ... (n) The
swan sn is white. (n
′) Therefore, there is a sufficiently high probability that
all swans are white.
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The emphasised string from 7.n′ is what effectively turns 3 into a de-
ductive argument. The meta-sentential predicate ‘there is a sufficiently high
probability that’ and a basic notion of probability guarantee that 7.n′ is (at
least momentarily) worth of our belief (given n is large enough, the premises
are true, and some methodological requirements were fulfilled in gathering
and analysing the data).
Now, before explaining how a special class of meta-sentential predicates
can help us improve our current theories of arguments, let us expand our
study of arguments and contentions into the structural study of the schemes
that characterise their structure.
3 Schemes
In the abstract field of argumentation theory, it does not suffice to study
isolated or specific arguments. If we want general results, which is the point
of an abstract study field, we need to asses argument schemes. Nevertheless,
the concept of argument scheme requires a clear concept of argument, which
we do not have yet. Hence, we will work first with (contention) schemes,
which are series of formulae where exactly one of them (the conclusion) is an
open formula preceded by a conclusion marker, and at least one of the others
(the premises) must be an open formula too.
Where open formulae can have free variables of any type (sentential,
predicative, individual, ...), I formally define schemes as follows:
Definition 8 (Scheme). The series σ1, ..., σn : . φ is a (contention) scheme
iff φ and at least one of σ1, ..., σn are open formulae.
Now, when evaluating schemes, we are only concerned with whether that
argument is generally valid: we want to know if all possible arguments with
the structure of that scheme are valid regardless of how we interpret their free
variables. We are not concerned with their soundness because open formulae
are normally neither true nor false—in which case their schemes could not
have true premises—and we are not interested in the cases where they are
(cf. section 5).2
An example of a generally valid argument scheme, modelled after argu-
ment 1, would be:
2Some philosophers have regarded open formulae as somewhat troublesome. Despite
not seeming to be proper truth-bearers, they often are part of our formal chains of deduc-
tion. This lead Francisco Miró Quesada [4] to propose a system of first order logic that
avoids the use of free variables. For its part, Jan  Lukasiewicz [3] was the first to propose
a method for assigning logical values to open formulae, although not precisely the typical
values ‘true’ and ‘false,’ but fractional ones in the closed interval [0, 1] ⊂ N.
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Scheme 9. (1) A is B. (2) x is A. (3) Thus, x is C.
As we already advanced, the structure of argument 1, which is represented
by scheme 9, is that of a well-known valid syllogism. Since an argument
is deductively valid by virtue of its form or structure, we may transfer the
validity of such an argument to another one sharing its structure.
All the above suggests extending the domain of the concept of validity
into schemes as follows:
Definition 10 (Scheme validity). A scheme σ1, ..., σn : . φ is deductively or
inductively valid iff it is deductively or inductively valid, accordingly, for
all σ1, ..., σn, and φ.
That the conclusion of a valid scheme cannot be a logical absurdity—which
follows from condition 5.2—, is particularly crucial here. To see why this is
important, we need to introduce the concept of sub-scheme, which is just an
scheme that results from saturating or binding some of the free variables of
its corresponding super-scheme.
Definition 11 (Sub-scheme). π1, ..., πn : . ψ is a sub-scheme of σ1, ..., σn : . φ
iff (1) π1, ..., πn : . ψ is a scheme, (2) π1  σ1, ..., πn  σn, and ψ  φ, and
(3) the set of free variables of ψ is a subset of that of φ, and similarly for
each πi with respect to σi.
Now, consider the following argument scheme modelled after the modus
ponendo ponens :
Scheme 12 (MPP). (1) If φ, then ψ. (2) φ. (3) Thus, ψ.
The following sub-scheme of 12 that is not valid in the sense of definition 10.
Scheme 13. (1) If φ, then ψ or ¬ψ. (2) φ. (3) Thus, ψ or ¬ψ.
Since the conclusion is tautological, assuming the tertium non datur, its
probability value is the maximum one and it equals its conditional probability
on the premises. Had we allowed for the conclusion of a valid argument to
be a logical absurdity, the general validity of scheme 12 would have been
passed to its sub-scheme 13, which would be a most undesirable result for
the reasons we have already seen.
It is important to point out here that definition 10 still preserves the
validity of all schemes σ1, ..., σn : . φ, such that σ1, ..., σn  φ, but neither φ is
a tautology nor any of σ1, ..., σn is a logical absurdity. This theorem assumes
some quite conventional properties of the probability relation.
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Theorem 14. The scheme σ1, ..., σn : . φ is valid iff σ1, ..., σn  φ holds for
all σ1, ..., σn, and φ (where φ is a not tautology and {σ1, ..., σn} is not trivial).
Proof. The left-to-right side follows immediately. The right-to-left side easily
obtains if we assume that (1) the probability of any logical absurdity is less
than the maximum probability, and that, (2) whenever σ1, ..., σn  φ, the
probability of φ given all of σ1, ..., σn is the maximum probability.
Hence, our definition of deductive validity discards a great amount of argu-
ments that it does not make sense to call valid—those with logically absurd
premises or tautological conclusions—while preserving all the rest.
The concept of scheme inductive validity, of course, can also be reduced
to that of deductive scheme validity as follows:
Definition 15 (Scheme inductive validity). A scheme σ1, ..., σn : . φ is in-
ductively valid iff the scheme σ1, ..., σn : . P(φ) ≥ τ is deductively valid for
all σ1, ..., σn, and φ.
In the following sections we are going to see that, by the hand of meta-
sentential predicates, we can use our concept of deductive validity for study-
ing other non-typical types of ‘validity.’
4 Meta-sentential predicates
I will call a meta-sentential predicate to any predicative expression that takes
a sentence (that can be the conclusion of an argument) as one of its arguments
and returns a meta-sentence (that can still be the conclusion of an argument).
A meta-sentential predicate can express, for example, an epistemic atti-
tude towards a sentence like ‘x is certain that φ’ or ‘there is good evidence
that φ,’ in which case we may call it an epistemic fragment [see 6]. It can
also express an (allegedly) objective property of a sentence, like the truth
predicate ‘it is true that φ’ or ‘it is the case that φ.’ Furthermore, they can
also be axiological predicates such as ‘it is good that φ’ and ‘it would be
disgusting that φ.’ Other meta-sentential predicates are not easy to classify,
as they could be considered to express an epistemic or an objective property,
as in modal predicates like ‘it is possible that φ’ or probabilistic predicates
such as ‘the probability of φ is n.3
The following condition must be satisfied by all such predicates:
3If we characterise probabilistic predicates as ‘epistemic,’ then we may be committed to
a subjective interpretation of probability. Although no such characterisation will be made,
it would bear no problem as this interpretation of probability is sufficiently adequate for
my purposes in this work.
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Postulate 16 (Meta-sentential predicate). A meta-sentential predicate C is
an n-place predicate, where at least one of its arguments is a formula and
returns a formula, all instances of these formulae can appear as the conclusion
of an argument.
Whenever a given sentence or formula is modified by appending a meta-
sentential predicate before it, we say that it has undergone a meta-sentential
predication. Hence, the formula C(φ) will be called the ‘meta-sentential pred-
ication of φ by C.’ I will extend this operation into contentions themselves,
so that the ‘meta-sentential predication of a contention by C’ will be the ar-
gument resulting from the meta-sentential predication of its conclusion by C.
Thus, 7.n′ is the meta-sentential predication of 3.n′ by ‘there is a sufficiently
high probability that’ and 7 is the meta-sentential predication of 3 by that
same meta-sentential predicate.
As we have already seen, inductive validity makes sense because there is
an intuitive way to link Sit to deductive validity, which consists in a meta-
sentential predication of its conclusion that makes the argument deductively
valid. But meta-sentential predications also open new ways for evaluating
and comparing the strength of arguments, which can be also used for more
appropriate characterisations of arguments.
5 Contextual validity
Some arguments clearly fail to meet both inductive and deductive standards
and, yet, are still considerably better than contention 2 (I like cookies...).
Argument 17. (1) Some Simpsons are yellow. (2) Lisa Simpson is a Simp-
son. (3) Therefore, Lisa Simpson is yellow.
Whether this argument is rationally accepted by someone will depend on the
underlying conventions and aims that shares with the arguer. If they only
aim at showing that the conclusion is possible, then it is fair to say that the
acceptance of the argument was not irrational. But if they were aiming at
proving that the conclusion is very likely, then this argument, as it stands,
absolutely fails.
Let us notice, though, that argument 17 can also be deductivised by
appending an modal (meta-sentential) predicate into its conclusion.
Argument 18. (1) Some Simpsons are yellow. (2) Lisa Simpson is a Simp-
son. (3) Therefore, it is possible that Lisa Simpson is yellow.
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This may suggest that, in principle, almost any argument could be deduc-
tivised through its meta-sentential predication by the modal predicate of
possibility. In fact, let us consider the following version of contention 2.
Contention 19. (1) I like cookies. (2) Thus, it is possible that Ana is French.
If we can conceive of a possible world where Ana is French, then the conclu-
sion 19.2 may be regarded as a logical true.
However, this would be contrary to the way in which I would like to pro-
pose that a meta-sentential predicate should transform a non-valid argument
into a valid one. Lucky me, definition 5 already disqualifies this argument as
valid one since, (a) unlike 18.1 to 18.3, premise 19.1 is irrelevant to its con-
clusion with or without the meta-sentential predicate, and (b) this definition
unequates deductive validity with entailment and excludes arguments with
logically true conclusions.
Hence, the following extensions of the concept of validity will preserve
the properties we already gained in definitions 5 and 10. I will, accordingly,
call ‘validity with respect to C’ or just ‘C-validity’ to the condition whereby
a contention becomes valid after being predicated by C.
Definition 20 (C-validity). An argument p1, ..., pn : . q is C-valid
iff p1, ..., pn : . C(q) is (inductively or deductively) valid.
This immediately translates into my general definition of scheme C-validity:
Definition 21 (Scheme C-validity). A scheme σ1, ..., σn : . φ is C-valid iff all
of its instances are C-valid.
Thus defined, meta-sentential predicates are the key to my first condition
of a stronger definition or argument.
Postulate 22 (Argument). In order for a contention p1, ..., pn : . q to be an
argument, it is necessary that there be a meta-sentential predicate C that
makes it C-valid.
It has to be noted, though, that this is but a first idea for a necessary (not
sufficient) condition of the definition of an argument, and that no complete
definition has been formulated here. One important point is related to the
fact that definitions 20 and 21 may define an infinite class of validities since
there can be as many types of C-valid arguments as meta-sentential predicates
are.
This leads us to the question of which meta-sentential predicates should
be part of the domain of postulate 22, which I cannot possibly address here.
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This investigation is for establishing the bases for the formal study of argu-
ments and fallacies, and it deals with those parts of argumentation theory
that can be formalised. Although I am open to be convinced otherwise,
I consider that the deciding what kind of linguistic expression qualifies as
a contextually acceptable meta-sentential predicate or not largely depends
upon informal and somewhat arbitrary conventions. For instance, it may
be suggested that P(q | p1, ..., pn) ≤ P(C(q) | p1, ..., pn) must be satisfied
by any meta-sentential predicate worthy of that name, but I myself am not
convinced about this.
In any case, once an appropriate definition of argument is reached, the
concept of argument scheme would be defined as follows:
Definition 23 (Argument scheme). A scheme σ1, ..., σn : . φ is an argument
scheme iff all its instances are arguments.
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